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Abstract 
Evaluative claims and assumptions are ubiquitous in positive psychology. Some will deny this. 
But such disavowals are belied by the literature. Some will consider the presence of evaluative 
claims a problem and hope to root them out. But this is a mistake. If positive psychology is to 
live up to its raison d'être—to be the scientific study of the psychological components of human 
flourishing or well-being—it must make evaluative claims. Well-being consists in those things 
that are good for us, that make life go well. Thus, one cannot investigate this topic without 
making claims about what is good for people and what they have reason to do. It’s time, 
therefore, to embrace the fact that positive psychology is value-laden. Doing so would benefit the 
field by allowing for more rigorous theorizing, and—perhaps counterintuitively—increasing the 
field’s objectivity. 
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Positive psychology is value-laden—It’s time to embrace it 
Positive psychology is rife with evaluative claims and presuppositions. This is precisely 
how it should be. Evaluative claims include claims about what is good or bad, right or wrong, 
what we should or have reason to do, and so on. The aim of the paper is to call upon researchers 
to be more open and explicit with such claims, and to reassure them that doing so will not 
impugn their scientific credentials. If positive psychology is going to study the topic it aims to—
the psychological components of human flourishing or well-being—then it cannot merely 
describe, it must also evaluate. To abstain from evaluation would mean failing to address that 
topic at all. Indeed, the real problem with the value claims in the field today is that they are so 
often made surreptitiously. In other words, the presence of value judgments is not a problem; but 
covering them up, or pretending they are something else, is. Pretending to be value-free is 
dishonest and shields these evaluative claims and assumptions from critical scrutiny. Far from 
undermining the field’s scientific credentials, making these claims and assumptions explicit 
would actually make the field more credible, and advance its aim of understanding human 
flourishing. 
In what follows I demonstrate that evaluative claims and assumptions are, and have 
always been, ubiquitous in the field. I then consider some unsuccessful strategies for rooting 
them out, before arguing that they are ineliminable. Finally, I address the worry that embracing 
the evaluative character of positive psychology’s subject matter would compromise the field’s 
credentials as a science. I argue that embracing value-ladenness would actually make the field 
more objective. 
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Values in positive psychology 
The claim that values pervade scientific practice is widely accepted amongst philosophers 
of science (Alexandrova, 2017, Chapter 4; Reiss & Sprenger, 2014; Turner, 2013). Philosophers 
debate which kinds of values are allowable, and what roles they should play. But there is no 
dispute over the fact that values are involved. A common view in the philosophy of science is 
that evaluative claims and assumptions—while they are acceptable in the process of scientific 
research—should not be allowed into its product. That is, values can play important roles in 
determining what gets researched (e.g., we should dedicate research funds towards ethical 
objectives like curing diseases) and how (e.g., there should be constraints on how research 
subjects are treated). Moreover, so-called ‘cognitive’ or ‘epistemic’ values, like simplicity and 
parsimony, can help determine which theories we accept. But, according to this traditional view, 
the results of scientific research should not include, explicitly or implicitly, evaluative claims. 
Science is supposed to describe how things are—not tell us what is good or bad, or what to do. I 
reject this traditional ideal, as shall become clear. But I’ll start by showing how positive 
psychology does not live up to it.1 
Some researchers are well aware of this. For instance, Self-Determination Theory ‘is 
unabashedly prescriptive and proscriptive’ (Niemiec & Ryan, 2013, p. 218). And Alan Waterman 
notes that the questions investigated by positive psychologists are, ‘[a]t their core… questions 
about how a person ought to live’ (2013, p. 3). Hence, there may be some readers for whom this 
paper’s thesis goes without saying. Yet, in general, the field has been resistant to this idea. Martin 
Seligman, credited with founding the field, and Ed Diener, arguably the most impactful 
researcher in it, ‘believe that social science should be descriptive and not prescriptive’ (2004, p. 
4). Seligman has repeatedly reaffirmed this stance: ‘My view of positive psychology is that it 
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describes rather than prescribes… [positive psychologists are] just describing what lots of people 
do’ (2011, p. 26). Similarly, in a book about virtues—after characterizing virtues as ‘morally 
valued’ traits that enable people to live ‘the good life’—Christopher Peterson and Seligman 
wrote that, ‘although our classification is decidedly about such values, it is descriptive of what is 
ubiquitous, rather than prescriptive’ (2004, p. 51).  
Explicitly evaluative claims 
These claims are strikingly out of place in the positive psychology literature. The mission 
and raison d'être of the field, from its very inception, has been to study ‘the best things in life’ 
and ‘what makes life most worth living’ (Seligman, 1999, p. 560). Positive psychologists seek ‘to 
understand and build the factors that allow individuals, communities, and societies to flourish’ 
and to ‘articulate a vision of the good life that is empirically sound… and attractive’ (Seligman & 
Csikszentmihalyi, 2000, p. 5). Motivated by the observation that psychology was ‘ill equipped to 
help individuals to live healthier and more meaningful lives… [or to promote] the best in 
people’, positive psychology was founded ‘to help people live and flourish, rather than merely to 
exist’ (Keyes & Haidt, 2003). It is ‘the scientific study of strengths, well-being, and optimal 
functioning’ (Duckworth et al., 2005, p. 631), and seeks ‘an evidence-based psychological 
understanding of the Good Life’ (Kashdan et al., 2008, p. 226). Indeed, positive psychologists 
claim to have identified ‘many contributors to the best kind of life’ (Fowers, 2008, p. 629), and 
even that ‘well-being is not only valuable because it feels good, but also is valuable because it 
has beneficial consequences’ (Diener & Seligman, 2004, p. 1). To say that someone is living 
well, has a good or meaningful life, is flourishing, or is realizing the best parts of themself, is 
plainly to make an evaluation. 
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Moreover, positive psychology is often claimed to be a recent addition to old 
philosophical traditions.  
The question of what is it that makes a life a good one is a central concern for 
humanity. Varied answers to this question are provided by philosophy, religion, 
political and cultural belief systems, and, of course, the science of psychology… 
(Kashdan et al., 2008, p. 228) 
The editors of a recent survey volume write that: 
The topic of this book, how to live well, is one of the oldest and most universal questions 
that has preoccupied human beings since the dawn of history. Philosophers, writers 
and artists and, more recently, empirical social scientists struggle to understand how 
life should be lived…  (Forgas & Baumeister, 2018, p. 1) 
Some researchers see themselves as eudaimonists like Aristotle (Ryff & Singer, 2008; Waterman, 
2008), or hedonists like Jeremy Bentham or John Stuart Mill (Diener et al., 1998; Kahneman, 
2003). The idea is that, with contemporary empirical tools, positive psychology can help answer 
the questions that interested these philosophers (Kesebir & Diener, 2008). But Aristotle, 
Bentham, and Mill were doing normative ethics—they were interested in what really matters in 
human life, and what goals we ought to pursue. Eudaimonism and hedonism are theories of 
value. If positive psychology is a part of such philosophical traditions, then it must be making 
evaluative claims.  
These kinds of claims are simply too ubiquitous to be dismissed as occasional 
overreaching. It’s implausible that all of these researchers have simply gotten carried away and 
forgotten the boundaries of their field. Rather, it seems clear that positive psychology is in the 
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business of making claims about what’s good in human life, and how we ought to live. Besides, 
what’s the point of this research otherwise? 
Implicit evaluative commitments 
In addition to explicitly evaluative claims, evaluative judgments frequently serve as 
unspoken assumptions, hidden in the research practices. As Laura King and colleagues write, the 
field’s ‘definition of “the good life” remains largely implicit in the outcomes we choose to study 
and promote’ (2004, pp. 35–36). Positive psychology is a field of many constructs, and its 
journals are filled with debates over which should be used. These debates frequently turn on tacit 
assumptions about which constructs better capture the true nature of well-being (Gruber et al., 
2011; Kashdan et al., 2008; Raibley, 2012, 2012; Ryff, 1989; Tiberius & Plakias, 2010; 
Waterman, 2008).  
Perhaps the most well-known debate concerns the use of hedonic and eudaimonic 
constructs. As Todd Kashdan and colleagues write, ‘[e]udaimonic theorists generally maintain 
that hedonic theories are inadequate to describe the Good Life’ (2008, p. 221; see, e.g., Huta & 
Waterman, 2014; Ryan & Deci, 2001; Ryff, 1989; Ryff & Keyes, 1995; Ryff & Singer, 2008; 
Tiberius & Hall, 2010; Waterman, 2008). Meanwhile, hedonic theorists maintain that eudaimonic 
constructs don’t maintain a strong enough connection between a person’s well-being and their 
own values (Diener et al., 1998; Kashdan et al., 2008). This debate, it should be observed, is a 
direct parallel of debates in the philosophical literature on well-being. ‘Objectivist’ theories claim 
that people can fail to want what is good for them, and ‘subjectivist’ theories claim that the 
constituents of a person’s good must be capable of ‘resonating’ with them (Heathwood, 2014; 
Rosati, 1996; Sarch, 2011). The difference is that, in the philosophical literature, no one denies 
that this is a debate about value. 
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The assumed implications of positive psychology research, and the way in which they are 
promoted to the public, are quite revealing. A great many books have been published for popular 
audiences with the aim of helping people to live better (Fredrickson, 2009; Gilbert, 2009; Haidt, 
2006; Lyubomirsky, 2008). Seligman himself opens his popular audience book with the claim 
that ‘[t]his book will help you flourish’, and he insists that his ‘writings are believable because of 
the underlying science’ (2011, p. 1). It’s unclear how he squares this with his insistence that 
positive psychology does not evaluate or prescribe. 
Positive psychology research is also considered to have implications for public policy. 
Diener and Seligman (2004) themselves argue that policy makers should be using the well-being 
measures developed by positive psychologists rather than more traditional economic measures of 
social welfare. The argument, in essence, is this: At one time, economic measures were a good 
assessment of how well people were doing. But, in countries with well-developed economies, 
where basic needs are now generally satisfied (with some egregious exceptions), these measures 
don’t accurately assess well-being. They should therefore be replaced by measures that directly 
assess the topic of interest. This argument is unquestionably value-laden. Diener and Seligman 
are saying that what matters—and what policy makers should be promoting—is individual well-
being, and the tools of positive psychology should therefore be used because they can measure it 
directly. Political ambitions like these reveal quite clearly that positive psychology is taken to 
bear on what people and even governments ought to do.  
Possible responses 
I anticipate two candidate responses to the suggestion that evaluative claims are 
ubiquitous in positive psychology. One is that, despite appearances, positive psychologists are 
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not actually making evaluative claims. The other is that, even if they do make such claims, they 
need not do so.  
A science of people’s values, not a science of value 
Positive psychology, one might argue, does not make evaluative claims. Rather, it reports 
on what ordinary people think is valuable. That is, positive psychologists shouldn’t tell people 
what is good; they should let those people tell them. These reported views can then serve as our 
guide in helping those people achieve what they independently care about. Ed Diener and 
colleagues hold this view: ‘With the increasing democratization and equality in the world, it is no 
longer defensible to rely only on kings and mandarins to prescribe the desirable life… [Our 
approach] allows people to define well-being for themselves… [W]e allow people to decide 
whether their lives are satisfying based on their individual values, goals, and life circumstances’ 
(1998, p. 35). The idea is that ‘experts’ should not decide what is good for people. We should use 
constructs that are ‘content free’ (Sheldon, 2013), and give ‘each individual the right to decide 
whether his or her life is worthwhile’ (Diener, 2000, p. 34). By letting participants decide for 
themselves whether their lives are going well, researchers can profess not to have endorsed any 
value claims themselves. 
However, defining ‘well-being’ as ‘subjective well-being’ (high positive affect and life or 
domain satisfaction, and low negative affect)—as Diener et al. were advocating—is not a value-
free, default position (Tiberius, 2013a). First, including affective constructs assumes that certain 
hedonic and/or emotional states are good for people. But this is something those very individuals 
might deny. Not everyone wants pleasant experiences or thinks they would be good for them. 
Think of a workaholic who cares primarily about career advancement and would gladly sacrifice 
any pleasant experience for a promotion. Or a masochist who actually wants painful experiences. 
POSITIVE PSYCHOLOGY IS VALUE-LADEN  10 
Think of the millions of people who visit the former extermination camp at Auschwitz each year. 
The place, it goes without saying, produces quite a bit of negative affect, and little positive 
affect. Yet people go there because they think experiences like this are an important part of the 
human experience, components of a rich, meaningful life. To build affective constructs into one’s 
approach thus presupposes contestable claims about what is good for people. 
One could try to avoid this issue by claiming that we should rely exclusively on life or 
domain satisfaction measures. Or, better yet, measures that go for a direct ask: ‘How well is your 
life going, according to your own standards?’ But now we have a different problem. Some people 
think that the only things that are good/bad for them are pleasant/unpleasant experiences. And we 
know that affective recall is not very reliable (Wilson & Gilbert, 2003). We also know about the 
peak-end rule, according to which what we remember most clearly, and what shapes our post 
facto evaluations of experiences, are moments of peak intensity and endings (Fredrickson & 
Kahneman, 1993; Kahneman et al., 1993; Redelmeier & Kahneman, 1996). This means that 
constructs like life satisfaction will be very poor indexes of what such people care about. 
Someone who has had lots of pleasant experiences for a long time, but who has very recently had 
less pleasant experiences, is going to report that his/her life is not going particularly well. But 
this would be, by this person’s own standards, a mistake. So, if we relied on post facto, cognitive 
assessments, we still would not be respecting each individual’s conception of well-being. 
Another problem with this approach is that relies on participant’s snap judgments, rather 
than their considered views (Haybron, 2011, 2013; Tiberius & Plakias, 2010). Study participants 
complete surveys like the Satisfaction With Life Scale (Diener & Emmons, 1985) in a matter of 
seconds, which is obviously not long enough for a serious evaluation of one’s life. People’s 
reported evaluative beliefs, including their conceptions of well-being, change dramatically even 
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with just little time spent in careful reflection. (Ask someone who has taught introductory 
courses in ethics.) In other words, people are not typically in touch with their own deepest cares 
and concerns. Thus, taking their spontaneous, unconsidered judgments as authoritative is not as 
respectful as one might think. It means listening to their surface-level feelings, rather than their 
deeper cares and values. 
 There is simply no way around this problem. The nature of well-being is sufficiently 
contested that there is no way of measuring something and calling it ‘well-being’ without 
contradicting the views of some of those measured. In any case, to argue that each individual 
ought to be allowed the freedom and autonomy to decide what his or her well-being consists in is 
already to endorse an evaluative claim. The view Diener et al. suggest in the quote above is a 
popular one in Western liberal democracies, where it’s common to think that society should be 
arranged so that each person is able to pursue his/her own conception of the good life. (In 
political philosophy, this view is known as “political liberalism”. See Rawls, 1996). But let’s 
be very clear about what this is: it’s a claim about what a just society looks like, and what we 
ought to do.  
A science of happiness 
One might think that, though value judgments are currently ubiquitous in the field, this is 
an avoidable mistake. They could be removed by restricting the scope of investigation. Perhaps, 
if positive psychology were merely the science of happiness—and made no claims about 
flourishing, well-being, the good life, etc.—then it could be value-free. Happiness, one might 
think, is nothing more than a psychological state. Of course, most people do typically value 
happiness. But, that’s up to them, and we can study happiness without assuming anything about 
its value.  
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A problem for this strategy is that research on the concept of happiness—as used by 
ordinary people, as well as happiness researchers—is sensitive to evaluative judgments (Phillips 
et al., 2011, 2014, 2017). If a person is living a morally good and/or meaningful life, people rate 
them as being happier than if they are living a psychologically equivalent but less virtuous or 
meaningful life. When people consider whether someone is happy, in other words, they are not 
just considering whether that person is in a particular kind of mental state; they are also 
evaluating the person and their life. So, restricting the field’s focus to happiness wouldn’t 
eliminate the evaluative character of the subject matter.  
The researchers who showed this, however, provide the resources for a response. Phillips 
et al. write that psychologists could be permitted to adopt a purely descriptive definition of 
happiness because, ‘technical definitions play an important theoretical role… and need not be 
aligned with the ordinary concepts’ (2017, p. 179). Just like the physicist’s definition of light is 
not beholden to ordinary ideas about light, the psychologist’s definition of happiness need not be 
beholden to the folk concept. There is something right about this claim. A physicist can and 
should use terms in whichever way best suits theoretical purposes. But social scientists are under 
obligations that physicists are not. Social scientists investigate topics and phenomena that 
ordinary people are deeply invested in—e.g., well-being, happiness, and love, as opposed to 
atoms, light, and gravity. Consequently, we cannot define terms without regard for what they 
mean in ordinary life. When psychologists report their findings on ‘happiness’, people will take 
this to concern the topic they have in mind when they use the word. Moreover, they are 
encouraged to do so by the way in which the findings are presented. If the technical definitions 
are not sufficiently similar to the ordinary senses of the terms, then there is sure to be 
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miscommunication and confusion. (Especially since, as indicated, scientists use of the concept 
evaluatively just like lay people.) 
Even worse, if the technical concept isn’t close enough to the folk concept, researchers 
could not claim to be investigating the phenomenon that interested us in the first place. We might 
retain the word, but we would have changed the subject. It’s a tricky question how much one can 
change a concept while preserving the topic (Prinzing, 2018). Technical concepts are sure to be 
more precise than their lay counterparts. But, in order to satisfactorily explicate a lay concept—
rather than surreptitiously change the subject—I believe that social scientific concepts need to 
respect the interests and purposes behind thought and talk about the topic in the first place. The 
most important interest people have in happiness is clearly its relevance to well-being (Haybron, 
2003). The reason we care about happiness is because we think it’s good. Any definition of 
‘happiness’ worth using—for empirical research, or for anything else—must respect this idea. 
Thus, even if positive psychology professed only to be the empirical study of happiness, it would 
still be that case that ‘the central question for this field is, What are the psychological states that 
are important for well-being?’ (Haybron, 2000, p. 217). This puts us right back where we started. 
Embracing it 
Investigating well-being necessarily involves making value judgments. The subject 
matter makes this a given. The concept of well-being is evaluative, and its functions are 
practical. The concept plays an important role in individual and collective deliberation. Decision-
making and advice employ it. Lifestyles and public policies are shaped with an eye towards it. 
For positive psychology research to actually help people, it has to address them on their own 
terms. In order to be relevant to these practical questions—relevant, that is, to individuals’ 
interest in well-being in the first place—the research had better respect the evaluative, action-
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guiding character of the subject matter. While empirical methods can shed light on how to 
achieve certain goals, they cannot tell us which ends are ultimately worth pursuing. For that we 
need values. Thus, to abstain from evaluation would be to change the subject. If positive 
psychology were to be value-free, then it would have no relevance to such practical matters. 
The upshot is that the field has two options. Either it can embrace the evaluative character 
of its subject matter, or it can abandon the goal investigating human well-being scientifically. 
The latter option, as I’m sure readers will agree, is a very bad one. Science is (one of) our best 
tool(s) for learning about the world. We should not abstain from using it to learn about a topic 
that we care so deeply about. It would be absurd to think that we should use scientific methods to 
learn about the mating behaviors of deep sea fish—which no one but a select group of biologists 
gives a whit about—but that we should not use them to learn about human flourishing and how 
we can promote it.  
Embracing the evaluative character of the subject matter, however, would require changes 
to the ways in which research is conducted and, more importantly, presented. Obviously, any 
pretense of value-freedom or neutrality would have to be dropped. Evaluative claims and 
assumptions would need to be made fully explicit. Construct selection, definition, and 
operationalization reveal our evaluative assumptions. Constructs should therefore be validated 
both empirically and evaluatively (Alexandrova & Haybron, 2016). That is, in addition to the 
usual psychometric validation, constructs must be shown to capture phenomena that feature in 
plausible theories of well-being. Moreover, preferences for different constructs should be 
acknowledged as reflecting, not merely differences in the interpretation of empirical results or 
the convenience of using different measures (as in, e.g., Biswas-Diener et al., 2009), but 
substantive disagreements about what makes life go well. This might be done in the introduction 
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and/or methods sections of publications, and might look something like: ‘We have chosen 
construct C, as assessed by measure M as our dependent variable. Our research team believes 
that C is an important constituent of human well-being because…’ I have heard of researchers 
including ‘value disclosures’ (à la financial disclosures) in presentations of their work. This is a 
step in the right direction. But it’s awfully cagey. One doesn’t ‘disclose’ one’s empirical or 
statistical methods. One states them straightforwardly, as essential components of the research. 
Evaluative assumptions, as I’ve argued, are no less crucial to the research, and should therefore 
be presented in the same way. 
Making our values explicit will benefit the field in two ways. First, it will allow for more 
rigorous theorizing about well-being. Second, it will make the presence of values in our research 
more legitimate by exposing them to public scrutiny and consequent refinement. 
Benefit 1: Better theorizing 
Given that evaluative claims will inevitably be made, those claims should be thoughtful, 
well-considered ones. That is, they should be based in a plausible and appealing theory of well-
being, a product of critical reflection on what makes a life good for the person living it. Positive 
psychology has been criticized, even by its own practitioners, for failing ‘to develop any fully 
integrated, coherent theory or model of the good life’ (Robbins & Friedman, 2017, p. 17; Dodge 
et al., 2012; Forgeard et al., 2011; Fowers, 2008; Gillett-Swan & Sargeant, 2015; Ryff & Keyes, 
1995). Philosophers have claimed that positive psychologists have proven ‘incapable of 
providing a clear account of their discipline’ and, as a result, the field ‘appears to be a giant 
hodgepodge… [with] no agreed upon definition’ of what it studies (Bishop, 2015, pp. 1, 4).  We 
are now well-positioned to see why this is so. A clear account of what positive psychology 
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studies, an ‘integrated, coherent theory’ of well-being, would need to include explicit evaluative 
claims, and positive psychologists have been uncomfortable with such things.  
But it is about time we got comfortable. In order to make progress on its founding 
aspirations, to realize its raison d'être, the field needs to reflect more seriously on what well-
being really is. A science of well-being simply must have clearly articulated, well-considered, 
publicly discussed vision of the good life. This need not, and assuredly will not, mean reaching a 
field-wide consensus. Being explicit about our values will not ensure that we all agree about 
what the good life looks like. What it would do is enable a serious, forthright dialogue about the 
merits of various conceptions of well-being. In other words, it would incorporate philosophical 
methods alongside empirical ones. For those not aware, critical reflection is what philosophy is 
all about (Popova, 2012; Priest, 2006). And ‘a critical, self-reflective dialogue about value’ is a 
good way of describing the practice of philosophical ethics. When it comes to investigating 
human flourishing, then, a sharp disciplinary boundary cannot be maintained. There is no such 
thing as aphilosophical thinking about the good life. Empirical methods are suitable for 
description, and philosophical methods are suitable for evaluation. But this topic is both 
descriptive and evaluative. Thus, neither set of tools is sufficient on its own. Each shines a light 
from one direction, casting a long shadow in the other. Shining both lights together is the only 
way to see the object of shared interest in its entirety. 
These days, philosophers making empirical claims or assumptions—which is at least 
most of them—are expected to be familiar with scientific research on the relevant topics. (This is 
not to say that all of them live up to this standard.) It’s only fair that empirical researchers 
making evaluative claims uphold the inverse standard. A great deal of philosophical work has 
been done on well-being (Crisp, 2017; Fletcher, 2016). Scientists interested in that topic might 
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make themselves more familiar with it. Some positive psychologists are already onboard with 
this. One does see, from time to time, a little philosophy in theory-heavy publications (e.g., Ryan 
& Deci, 2001; Ryff & Singer, 1998).  
Typically, however, psychologists are not trained philosophers. They have little practice 
in rigorous philosophical reasoning and, in any event, aren’t paid to do it. The result is that, even 
those who realize how important philosophy is to positive psychology tend to have somewhat 
sketchy, incomplete surveys of the philosophical literature, and a limited understanding of the 
issues and debates. We shouldn’t expect psychologists to be good philosophers any more than we 
expect philosophers to be good psychologists. An intellectual division of labor, which allows for 
the advantages of specialization, would improve productivity. That is to say, both fields would be 
better off if they collaborated more closely. Philosophical theories are better for being more 
empirically-informed; and empirical research is better for being more philosophically-informed. 
Thankfully, the ranks of empirically-minded philosophers interested in well-being are swelling 
(e.g., Alexandrova, 2017; Haybron, 2016; Tiberius, 2013). 
Benefit 2: Greater objectivity 
I believe that positive psychologists have been resistant to the kind of explicitness I call 
for out of fear that open discussions about values will somehow impugn the field’s scientific 
credentials. If we are making claims about value, then can we remain ‘objective’ scientists? 
Heather Douglas, a philosopher of science, humorously notes that ‘[o]bjectivity is one of 
the most frequently invoked yet vaguely defined concepts’ (2007, p. 131). If being objective just 
means making no evaluative claims, then the study of well-being can never be objective. But 
many sciences are in the same position as positive psychology. Consider medical science. The 
concepts of health and disease are partially evaluative (Hausman, 2015; Kingma, 2007, 2014; 
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Wakefield, 1992). What it means to be healthy is, roughly, for one’s body to be functioning well, 
or as it should. Health is, of course, something we value. And it would seem that we value it 
precisely because it’s a central component or precondition of well-being. Similarly, a disease is 
not merely a physiological abnormality. Abnormalities that are in no way bad for a person, that 
don’t cause them harm, aren’t considered diseases. Something is only considered a pathology 
when it is negatively evaluated. Yet no one thinks that, because medical science studies health 
and disease, it is therefore a less ‘objective’ or legitimate form of science. Clearly, we need a 
different, more realistic ideal of objectivity. While it is beyond the scope of this paper to 
articulate such an ideal, here is a proposal for the relationship between objectivity and evaluative 
claims in science: values threaten objectivity when they are left implicit and are therefore 
unscrutinized. Imagine, for comparison, if researchers were not expected to be entirely 
transparent about their measurement methods or data analysis techniques. This would 
undoubtedly compromise their scientific credentials and the quality of their work. Things are no 
different when it comes to evaluative judgments. 
To illustrate, at one time masturbation and homosexuality were listed as pathologies in 
medical handbooks and the DSM respectively (Drescher, 2015; Engelhardt, 1974). We now think 
that was a mistake. These ‘conditions’ are not pathologies because they are not (or at least not 
necessarily) bad for people. They were pathologized because the researchers’ values shaped their 
work. But what was problematic in these cases was not the fact that evaluative judgments were 
made (that’s inevitable). What was problematic was the fact that those evaluative judgments 
were never seriously questioned. They were not subjected to sufficient criticism and debate. It 
was only when they finally were subjected to scrutiny that masturbation and homosexuality lost 
their ‘pathological’ status.  
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Thus, it seems to me that the ideal of scientific objectivity ought to be one of openness 
and intellectual humility. That is, all claims—be they empirical, mathematical, evaluative, etc.—
should be made clearly and candidly so that they can be subjected to critical reflection and 
ongoing, public critique and debate. If the research misses something important, or focuses on 
something that no one has any reason to care about, then people should be able to speak up and 
say so. Even the most popular conceptions of well-being are open to challenge. And dissenting 
voices should be able to question prevailing assumptions. This is only possible, of course, if 
those assumptions are stated clearly.  
If they anticipated such scrutiny, researchers would likely be more reflective and self-
critical when they make evaluative judgments in the first place, thus preventing them from 
complacently maintaining unexamined values. But we needn’t rely solely on individuals. As 
social psychologists are well aware, people are quite good at finding ways to bolster and defend 
their own views in the face of contrary evidence—especially when their values are involved 
(Nickerson, 1998). This is why academic institutions are (supposed to be) designed to pit 
competing views against each other. The rationale is that the truth will emerge victorious when 
ideas compete on a fair playing field—even if the advocates of those ideas are deeply biased. 
Being explicit with evaluative judgments would allow them to be treated like empirical findings 
in this regard. They could be presented publicly, with as much transparency as possible, and then 
defended, revised, or abandoned in the face of open debate. We should, after all, be open to 
changing our conceptions of well-being as we learn more. Our values and empirical beliefs are 
interdependent. Reflecting on what matters to us will change how we think and what we do. And 
learning more about how the world works will change what we value.  
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Conclusion 
Positive psychology promises to help us gain an empirically informed understanding of 
the psychological components of human flourishing. This is one of the noblest of ambitions. But 
we cannot achieve this end without first coming to terms with the fact that doing so will involve 
making evaluative claims: claims about what is good in life, and what we should do. Attempting 
to avoid talking about value means either endorsing evaluative claims unwittingly and 
unreflectively, or changing the subject altogether. If we’re going to pursue the psychology of 
human flourishing—and we certainly should—then we need to get comfortable with making 
explicit, well-considered, publicly scrutinized claims about value. This may take some getting 
used to. But it’s what must be done if we are to fulfill the field’s raison d'être with candor and 
integrity. 
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Footnotes 
1  While I focus on positive psychology (as it is the field I’m familiar with) a lot of these points 
will apply equally to other social sciences (Douglas, 2007, 2013; Dupré, 2007). This is because 
social scientists typically study phenomena picked out by what philosophers call ‘thick ethical 
concepts’ (Kirchin, 2013; Williams, 1985). Thick concepts have both descriptive and evaluative 
content. To apply a thick concept is to judge that something has certain empirical properties as 
well as certain evaluative properties. For example, bravery isn’t merely a willingness to face 
danger. Those willing to face the danger of walking off a cliff aren’t brave; they’re stupid. 
Bravery is being willing to face danger for a good cause, or when it’s right to do so, or some 
such thing. It turns out that many folk psychological concepts—including emotion concepts like 
love—are thick (Phillips et al., 2011). Or consider aggression (Longino, 2013). Central to this 
concept are the notions of harm and offence (Ramírez & Andreu, 2006), which are evaluative. A 
harm just is something that is bad for a person. And we wouldn’t think that a friendly hello was 
aggressive just because an irate person took unjustified offence. That someone took offense is 
only significant to the aggressiveness of the action if the action merited that offence. Whether 
this is so is an evaluative or normative question, not an empirical one. Other thick concepts 
include health and disease (Hausman, 2015; Kingma, 2014), economic efficiency and 
unemployment (Hausman & McPherson, 2006), and—of course—well-being.  
If there is anything distinctive about positive psychology here, it’s the fact that the research 
products—claims about the nature of human flourishing—are so obviously evaluative. In 
contrast, it’s often less clear whether, for instance, an economist’s claims about economic 
efficiency are value-laden. 
